Corr v IBC Vehicles Court of Appeal (Civil Division), 31st
March 2006, 2006 WL789499 (CA(Civ Div))
Mr Corr was involved in an accident at work. He was nearly
decapitated after an equipment malfunction. He lost most of his
right ear and had to undergo painful reconstructive surgery. He
also suffered persistent unsteadiness, mild tinnitus, severe
headaches and difficulty in sleeping. In addition to what was
described as a serious physical injury, he developed post-tramatic
stress disorder and latterly severe depression. He raised a claim
against his employers in relation to his injuries but unfortunately
before it came to trial he committed suicide. Mr Corr's widow
continued with his claim as the administrator of his estate in
relation to the original injuries and she also introduced a second
element to the claim seeking damages for the subsequent
suicide.
The damages in relation to the original accident were agreed and
the case went to trial on the question of whether the employers
were liable for the subsequent suicide. Initially Mr Nigel Baker QC
sitting as a deputy judge of the High Court decided that the
Defendant/employers were not liable for the suicide on the basis
that it had not been reasonably foreseeable at the time of the
original accident. (2005 WL1033547 (QBD)).
The Court of Appeal, by a majority of two to one overturned the
decision.
The most detailed opinion was given by Lord Justice Ward and
although he was not in favour of the appeal his approach was
commended by his colleagues, Lords Justice Sedley and Wilson.
Lord Justice Ward began by noting that the Defendants admitted
the accident was caused by their negligence and that as a result Mr
Corr suffered both physical and psychiatric injury. The question
for the court was whether the Defendants could be held responsible
for the subsequent suicide. In deciding they were not, Lord Justice
Ward looked at three issues:-
Firstly whether as a matter of fact it could be established that
the physical and psychiatric injuries arising from the original
incident were the cause of the subsequent suicide. He noted that
evidence had been led at the original trial from a psychiatrist and
psychologist to the effect that depression was a common
complication of post traumatic stress disorder and that between one
in six and one in ten sufferers of severe depression took their own
life. Lord Justice Ward had no difficulty in finding a clear
connection between the original breach of duty by the Defendants
and Mr Corr's decision to take his own life.
The second issue was whether Mr Corr's decision to take his own
life should of itself be seen as a new act sufficient to break the
chain of causation. Lord Justice Ward pointed out that although a
party acting under duress knew what he was doing, he may be
powerless to restrain himself. The question had to be whether what
the party had done was the product of full, free and informed
thought. Lord Justice Ward had no difficulty in finding that in
this case the medical evidence established quite clearly that Mr
Corr's sense of hopelessness was so strong and powerful it
dominated his decision process and was ultimately the cause of his
suicide. He therefore found himself unable to characterise the
suicide as a free, deliberate and informed act sufficient to break
the chain of causation.
The last issue was whether the suicide and the damages arising
as a result could be seen as too remote from the original accident.
The question he asked himself was whether the suicide was
reasonably foreseeable in light of the circumstances which were or
ought to have been known at the time the accident occurred. He
found that it was not foreseeable that Mr Corr, a man described as
happy in his life, would lapse into such a dark depression as a
result of the accident that he would some years later kill himself.
He didn't blame the Defendants or Mr Corr for the suicide but
instead characterised it as a tragic accident. He was however
critical of the Defendants for not apologising to Mr Corr for their
original negligence when it had been suggested in one of his
medical reports that an apology would benefit him greatly.
The disagreement between the judges in the Court of Appeal
related only to the issue of foreseeability. Lord Justice Sedley
did not accept that the likelihood of suicide needed to be
foreseeable at the time of the original incident. As he put it
"if a case of suicide is to be excluded, it has to be because
the evidence has failed to establish that the judgement and
volition of the deceased were overwhelmed by the depression
consequent on the injury. That is in each case a matter of factual
enquiry."
On the basis of the medical evidence led in this case Lord
Justice Sedley had no difficulty in finding that it had been
established that the judgement and volition of Mr Corr was
overwhelmed by the depression consequent on the original
injury.
Similarly Lord Justice Wilson could not accept the suggestion that
the claimant needed to establish that at the time of the original
accident the suicide was reasonably foreseeable. He had no
difficulty in finding that where injury was foreseeable Defendants
could also be liable for recognised mental illness or other
conditions arising out of the injury even if the development of
those conditions was not reasonably foreseeable. He did not see any
justification for the suggestion that suicide was a special kind of
damage which required to be treated differently from personal or
psychiatric injury and thus required to be separately foreseeable.
Reflecting on the medical evidence he had no difficulty in finding
that it had been demonstrated that the suicide was one of, indeed
the ultimate, effect of the psychiatric illness for which the
Defendants had been found responsible.
This case seems to us to illustrate that there is now much
greater understanding of the inter relationship between physical
injury and psychiatric illness. The quality of the medical evidence
has improved and, as a result, the courts are now much more
comfortable with, and prepared to accept, that the effects of an
accident, particularly a life threatening one, can extend beyond
the purely physical. It is clear from the judgement that the
medical evidence given on behalf of the plaintiff was very
persuasive. It is interesting the Defendants did not lead any
medical evidence of their own. In cases of this type it is clearly
imperative to get the right medical experts involved as early as
possible.