1069 - 1657

Courting danger

Webster v The Ridgeway School - High Court of Justice Queen's Bench Division, 5 February 2010

While the courts have thankfully been slow to find that the duty of care upon local education authorities is as extensive as claimants and their solicitors would like; this does little to dampen their enthusiasm.

A recent example is the English case of Webster v The Ridgeway Foundation School [2010] EWHC 157. The claimant, Henry Webster, sought damages for injuries he sustained as a result of a fight with a fellow pupil in the school grounds. Nothing out of the ordinary for a 15 year old boy, you might think: however, the circumstances of the fight and the results for poor Henry are the stuff of every parent's nightmares.

Prior to the fight, Henry had been involved in an altercation with a younger pupil. He agreed to have a fight with the boy on the school's tennis courts after the school day finished at 3.50pm. Henry had specified that the fight should be "one on one". Unbeknown to him the younger boy had telephoned his older brother who in turn had contacted other friends and relations. A number of them came onto the school grounds.

The younger boy, together with two of his friends, pointed Henry out to the adults. Three of them entered the tennis courts and attacked Henry. One had a claw hammer which he used to beat Henry about the head. Henry was then kicked by a number of pupils while he lay on the ground. Henry suffered a compound depressed skull fracture with an underlying frontal lobe contusion. He made a generally good recovery, but unfortunately was left with severe brain damage. Following a police investigation a number of those involved in the assault were convicted of causing grievous bodily harm.

This present claim arose because Henry and his parents sought to impose civil liability upon the school for failing to prevent the fight. The case was based primarily on negligence with an additional claim founded on the school's duties under the Human Rights Act 1998. They alleged that the school had failed in its duty in a number of respects: first, the school had failed to take proper care to keep the site secure; secondly, the school was negligent not to fence the site so as to keep intruders out; thirdly, the school ought to have ensured that a member of teaching staff was on duty at the end of the day, either on the tennis courts or at the gate between the tennis courts and the main road; fourthly, the school was negligent in failing to do more to establish better discipline in the school and deal more effectively with racial tensions which were said to prevail in the school (Henry was white, those who attacked him were Asian); and fifthly, it was alleged that the school should have done more to protect Henry on the date of the assault.

In his judgment Mr Justice Nicol confirmed that the school did indeed owe Henry a duty to take reasonable care to keep him reasonably safe while he was on school premises. However, that duty had not been breached. Moreover, there was no causal link between the things the school had not done and the injuries received by Henry. Crucially, the injuries were not a foreseeable consequence of the school's supposed "omissions".

Mr Justice Nicol cited the Court of Appeal decision in Gower v The London Borough of Bromley [1999] EWCA Civ 2012 where Lord Justice Auld said, when considering the scope of the duty incumbent upon teaching staff:

"The Head Teacher and teachers have a duty to take such care of pupils in their charge as a careful parent would have in like circumstances, including a duty to take positive steps to protect their wellbeing."

While he noted that the attack on Henry had taken place after the school day that was not determinative of the end of the school's duty towards its pupils, particularly as Henry was still on school premises. In considering whether there was a duty of care, his Lordship applied the threefold test set out in Caparo Industries v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605. It was reasonably foreseeable that on occasions outsiders might seek to harm pupils in a school. There was a relationship of proximity in the school/pupil relationship at least while pupils were on the premises. However, would it be fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care? It was recognised that Henry's injuries were caused by outsiders and not by pupils under a degree of control from the school.

His Lordship acknowledged that schools may be under a duty to protect pupils from other outside influences, such as traffic hazards. As such, it was fair, just and reasonable that the school have a duty to take reasonable care to safeguard and protect Henry from attack by outsiders. The judge did not agree that the school's adoption of the policies to which the claimants referred meant that it had assumed responsibility for seeing that they were carried out or enforced. Henry did not base his claim on an action for breach of statutory duty. However, importantly for defenders generally, and in line with previous case authority on the issue, the school had a duty to take reasonable care to see that Henry was reasonably safe during school hours and for a reasonable period after the end of the school day while he was still on the school's premises.

To succeed in his claim Henry would require to establish that the school had been in breach of that duty and that the breach was causative of his injuries.

In particular, was the school in breach of its duty of care by not constructing a perimeter fence? A fence had been constructed after the attack on Henry, costing in the region of £150,000. However, Henry was unable to point to any particular regulation or statutory provision which required a school to fence education premises. There was no evidence that such fencing was universal practice. In the absence of an unwavering requirement, and given the evidence that the risks were not so grave that the school was nonetheless obliged to overcome them, it was held that the school had not breached its duty by failing to construct a perimeter fence.

Was the school in breach of its duty of care because no staff were on duty on the tennis courts or at the tennis court gate at the end of the school day? Henry placed particular emphasis on the school's own security policy which provided that at the start of the school day there should be members of staff on the front drive of the school and at a further entrance to ensure that pupils moved into the school when they arrived. At the end of the school day staff were to be located by all of the exits. Mr Justice Nicol did not agree that the gate to the tennis court was one of the exits. The tennis court gate was not an exit from a building; it was just one of the ways of leaving the site. The security policy could not have meant that there would be staff at every point where a pupil could leave the site. Moreover, the school site was enormous. The evidence was that if there had been staff at the tennis courts, the fight would have taken place elsewhere.

So had the school been in breach of its duty because of its disciplinary approach? Henry argued the standards of discipline in the school were poor. The number of Asian students had increased and racial tensions had exacerbated the poor behaviour. Asian boys, it was alleged, were treated more leniently and this allowed a culture of impunity to develop. In response the school argued that behaviour was not as bad as was portrayed and was not out of the ordinary for a large comprehensive school. Extensive evidence was led from members of staff about the measures taken to prevent racial tensions and ease behavioural difficulties. This evidence was accepted, but even if Henry had been able to establish negligence, he could not show that it was reasonably foreseeable this would cause him harm. The injuries were the result of blows from a hammer wielded by an outsider. The school's disciplinary policy did not impinge on the principal assailant.

The judgment is obviously peculiar to the facts of the assault. Nevertheless, it is a useful rehearsal of the authorities and issues relevant to consideration of an education authority or school's duty of care towards its pupils both during and outwith school hours. It confirms that a school does indeed owe its pupils a duty of care to keep them reasonably safe while on school premises. Whether that duty is breached is a question of fact to be determined following an evidential hearing and in this case, such evidence took almost 24 days.

Contributed by Lynne Macfarlane

 

 

 

 

 

 

Subscribe to our news feeds

Keep up-to-date with all of our publications, legal updates, firm news and events.

Firm NewsLegal UpdatesSMIBEvents