Spencer v Wincanton Holdings Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ
1404
Mr Spencer sued his employer following an accident at work. It
was accepted by the defendant that this had been caused by the
negligence of Mr Spencer's colleague. Liability was conceded at an
early stage. As a consequence of the accident the claimant
sustained what was described initially as a minor knee injury.
However, the claimant's knee remained unremittingly painful, and he
eventually gave up work. After finding alternative employment, and
on advice from his doctor, he underwent an above-knee
amputation.
He made a good recovery, and was fitted for a prosthesis. He
purchased a car with an interim payment made by the defendant; it
was an automatic, and once it had been altered would allow him to
drive this while wearing his prosthesis. In the interim, he took
off his artificial limb so he could drive the vehicle, and instead
of replacing his prosthesis to exit the car he would rely on sticks
to get about.
A week before the car was due to be altered, the claimant was
driving to work and stopped to fill up with petrol. Instead of
calling for assistance, he exited the vehicle, and filled up the
tank. He did this without putting his prosthesis on, nor did he use
his sticks. He steadied himself by leaning on the car. On the way
back to his vehicle, he tripped on a raised manhole cover. He
sustained severely torn ligaments in his uninjured left leg, and
was subsequently confined to a wheelchair.
Wincanton brought the owners of the petrol forecourt into the
action, blaming them for the injury to Mr Spencer's left leg. The
judge in the County Court exonerated them: any damage flowing from
this incident formed part of the damage for which the defendants
were liable. However, he reduced these damages by a third to take
into account Mr Spencer's actions.
Wincanton appealed this decision. They did so on the basis that
the judge had erred in law in finding that the damage sustained in
the garage forecourt could be said to flow from their negligence.
The issue, therefore, was one of causation. More specifically the
issue was whether Mr Spencer's actions at the garage represented a
novus actus interveniens - a new intervening act - which
could break the chain of causation.
The discussion in the case makes it clear that when considering
whether an act on the part of a claimant constitutes a novus
actus, the court will look at whether the claimant acted
unreasonably. It was noted that a defendant is liable for all
consequences that forseeably flow from their negligent act.
However, foreseeability itself does not define the concept of
novus actus. Unreasonable actions may be reasonably
foreseeable. Therefore, when considering the claimant's actions,
the court must consider whether he acted reasonably in the
circumstances. To break the chain of causation the extent of the
unreasonableness must be very high.
In this case the court could not hold that the judge at first
instance had erred in his assessment. They therefore agreed that Mr
Spencer's actions were not so unreasonable as to constitute a
novus actus. Mr Spencer's contribution had been adequately
reflected in the finding of contributory negligence. It is noted,
however, that their Lordships were keen to highlight that these
cases turn very much on their facts, and were unlikely to provide
the basis for future guidance in this area.
Contributed by Katy Nisbet